Analysis of defense industry consolidation effects on program acquisition costs by Hoff, Russell V.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2007-12
Analysis of defense industry consolidation effects on
program acquisition costs
Hoff, Russell V.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION 








 Thesis Co-Advisors:  Nayantara Hensel 
  Doug Brook 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2007 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Analysis of Defense Industry Consolidation Effects on 
Program Acquisition Costs 
6. AUTHOR(S) Russell V. Hoff 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER   
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
  AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Massive consolidation within the defense industry began after the end of the Cold War. The defense industry 
felt economic pressures and responded by consolidating at various levels. Merging companies should create a positive 
synergy by combining the best attributes from each company. This synergy, in theory, should manifest itself in, 
among other things, a cost savings in defense programs. This thesis examines if cost changes are evident due to 
consolidation within the defense industry by conducting a regression analysis of Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
across thirteen broad defense market sectors. The findings suggest that while consolidation may yield savings as a 
result of synergy, this does not seem to be true for all mergers; they do not always save costs. Furthermore, not every 
merger experiences a statically significant cost estimate change. Comparison of regression results across all the 
examined programs suggests that when there is a statistically significant cost change following a merger, that change 
shows a greater likelihood a cost estimate decrease than an increase. A categorical comparison across defense market 
sectors, branch of services, prime contractors, and by the company’s role during the consolidation experience (i.e., 
Target or Acquirer) suggest potential trends in cost estimate changes within each category. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
75 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Defense Industry, Consolidation, Merger, Acquisition, Selected Acquisition 
Report, Major Defense Acquisition Program, Program Costs 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION EFFECTS ON 
PROGRAM ACQUISITION COSTS 
 
 
Russell V. Hoff 
Major, United States Army 
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1997 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























   Robert N. Beck,  
Dean, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
Massive consolidation within the defense industry began after the end of the Cold 
War. The defense industry felt economic pressures and responded by consolidating at 
various levels. Merging companies should create a positive synergy by combining the 
best attributes from each company. This synergy, in theory, should manifest itself in, 
among other things, a cost savings in defense programs. This thesis examines if cost 
changes are evident following consolidation within the defense industry by conducting a 
regression analysis of Major Defense Acquisition Programs across thirteen broad defense 
market sectors. The findings suggest that while consolidation may yield savings as a 
result of synergy, this does not seem to be true for all mergers; they do not always save 
costs. Furthermore, not every merger experiences a statically significant cost estimate 
change. Comparison of regression results across all the examined programs suggests that 
when there is a statistically significant cost change following a merger, and that there is a 
greater likelihood of cost estimate decrease than an increase. A categorical comparison 
across defense market sectors, branch of services, prime contractors, and by the 
company’s role during the consolidation experience (i.e., Target or Acquirer) suggests 
potential trends in cost estimate changes within each category. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
Consolidation of two or more firms is a business decision that can either be 
internally or externally motivated in order to position the company for economic 
development. Consolidation of firms can occur in two ways: mergers or acquisitions1. 
Two (or more) merging companies should create a positive synergy by combining the 
best attributes from each company. This synergy, in theory, should manifest itself in, 
among other things, a cost savings in programs. Possibilities of cost savings may be 
attributed to synergistic effects such as improved efficiency through organizational 
restructuring, improvements in technology, or capitalization of particular expertise. 
Regardless of how the merger or acquisition occurs, theoretically, the two firms should 
be more efficient together than separately. Thus, there should be some cost savings 
realized as a result.   
Massive consolidation within the defense industry began after the end of the Cold 
War. According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), the majority of the mergers occurred 
between 1990 and 1998. The General Accountability Office (GAO) testified before the 
Senate that the number of defense contractors declined to twenty major contractors in the 
sectors important to national security (Cooper, 1998, 1). Andrade et al. (2001), Bruner 
(2004), Gaughan (2006), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) have shown empirically that 
consolidation across industries is not a steady trend of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
through the years, but rather in a series of waves showing an “industry-based pattern” 
(Bruner, 75), clustering by industries (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). This pattern, seen in 
the defense sector, has resulted in the overwhelming majority of defense prime contracts 
being divided among the five top-tier aerospace and defense contractors (Lockheed-
Martin, Northrop-Grumman, Boeing, Raytheon, and General Dynamics) (See the figures 
in the Appendix). 
                                                 
1 Conglomerates are a subset of acquisitions. A conglomerate is a consolidation of numerous and 
mostly unrelated business. General Electric is a good example of a conglomerate. 
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The policy challenge for the DoD is to balance defense industry consolidation 
with competition and innovation, while not negatively impacting national security 
initiatives or exceeding budgetary constraints. The items that directly affect consolidation 
and costs include: then Deputy Secretary of Defense Perry’s memorandum encouraging 
consolidation, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 enacted to 
share restructuring costs that result from consolidation, and defense appropriation bills, 
which constrains agencies’ expenditures. 
In 1993, then Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry held a meeting with 
defense industry leadership to inform them of drastic reductions in future defense 
expenditures and to encourage them to consolidate. That meeting earned the sobriquet 
“the Last Supper.” The expectation was that the consolidation activities would reduce 
excess industrial capacity and achieve a cost saving for DoD through reduced overhead 
costs.  
Also in 1993, Norman R. Augustine, then CEO of Lockheed Martin, headed an 
effort involving other major defense industry executives to persuade DoD to offset the 
restructuring costs of the mergers. To expedite and encourage consolidation, DoD 
adopted the policy on 21 July 1993 that allowed restructuring costs to be reimbursed as 
overhead costs, but only if there were savings to the government. Restructuring payments 
became an object for scrutiny. An April 1997 GAO report found that the government 
“reimbursed $179M of $849M in costs” and that savings translated to “$1.93 for every 
$1.00 spent” (Cooper, 1997, 4). Congress submitted legislation to end the practice of 
paying restructuring costs but ended up only restricting the cost payments to pay only if 
savings were at least 2 to 12 (very close to the GAO amount of $1.93 found in their 
report). The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) has lead responsibility for 
implementing the DoD’s restructuring regulations.  
The congressionally-approved defense appropriation bill allocates a portion of the 
United States yearly discretionary federal budget to fund the DoD activities, which 
includes procurement initiatives. When consolidation began in 1993, the DoD spent close 
                                                 
2 Section 804 of Public Law 105-85. 
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to $80 billion on procurement (Cooper, 1998, 2). By 1998, those expenditures had 
precipitously dropped to around 40 percent to $53 billion (Cooper, 1998, 2).  
The defense industry felt economic pressures and responded by consolidating at 
various levels. When these consolidating companies are building government products, 
the cost to the government should decrease as a result of increased efficiencies and, 
thereby, save defense dollars. Since M&A are supposed to be more efficient from the 
synergistic effect, has the consolidation of defense industry contractors saved acquisition 
costs for various defense programs? This thesis addresses this question using an empirical 
analysis of Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) cost data from Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SAR). 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions were designed to examine costs associated with 
M&A and how policy affected M&A and competition, and, possibly, costs. A policy 
analysis coupled with a regression analysis addresses the relationship merger effects may 
have had on overall program acquisition costs. 
1. Primary Research Question 
1. Has defense industry consolidation from 1993-2006 saved acquisition 
costs for various Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP)3? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
1.  Why did the Department of Defense (DoD) encourage defense industry 
consolidation and what policies were developed to support and encourage 
consolidation?  
2.  What were the acquisition policy objectives regarding consolidation?  
3.  What were the acquisition policy outcomes regarding costs?  
4.  What effect did the defense industry consolidation have on competition? 
5.  How did program costs change immediately post-merger?  
                                                 
3 Programs are considered a major program if research and development costs exceed $365 million or 
its procurement exceeds $2.19 billion in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. 
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6.  How did program costs change post-merger allowing time lag (i.e., for 
synergistic effects to be realized)?  
7.  How did consolidation affect program costs within various defense 
sectors? 
8.  How did consolidation affect program costs within each branch of service?  
9.  How did consolidation affect program costs with prime contractors within 
the defense industry? 
C.  RESEARCH BENEFIT 
This thesis examines if MDAP cost changes are evident due to consolidation 
within the defense industry. The findings of this thesis will provide empirical evidence of 
how consolidation effects defense program costs.  
D.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis consisted of: a literature search of books, 
scholarly and trade journal articles, DoD references, and other information sources on 
defense industry consolidation; a review of acquisition policy reform affecting defense 
industry consolidation; a review of previous Government Accountability Office4 (GAO) 
reports and RAND Corporation reports on program costs and policy changes; an 
organization of Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) cost data on 359 high-cost category 
DoD programs (DoD, 1980-2006); a regression analysis across thirteen broad defense 
market sectors to identify statistically significant cost changes occurring post-merger; a 
comparative analysis of post-merger cost changes across broad defense market sectors, 
branches of service, prime contractors, and companies’ role in the merger or acquisition; 
and an interpretation of the regression results to identify cost trends and policy reform 
impacts.  
                                                 
4 The General Accounting Office changed its name to Government Accountability Office on 7 July 
2004. 
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E.  SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis is limited by design to focus on costs changes of Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAP). MDAP is not all inclusive of defense budget 
expenditures. At any given time, there are around 700 DoD major and minor programs; 
this thesis looks at 358, but, by using certain selection criteria as discussed in a later 
chapter, culled the number of programs analyzed to 64. Contrary to minor cost programs, 
data submission is mandatory for MDAP and makes accessing data relatively simple. 
Although acquisition policy reform is a perpetual activity, this thesis narrowly focuses on 
those policies that impact consolidation or program cost changes. 
This thesis investigates if mergers create synergy that is manifested in a decrease 
in program costs. This is not an all inclusive study of possible motives and rational of 
why mergers occur or the nuances, such as the partial absorption of assets, regarding each 
consolidation within all industries, or the reasons for success or failure, but rather 
investigates how “mergers of equals” – including horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate 
(Gaughan, 1996; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; and Weston et al., 1990) in terms of size 
within the defense industry – may have affected program costs.  
F.  ORGANIZATION 
This analysis compares normalized cost estimates of defense programs that fall 
among the largest defense contractors to see if savings are realized post-merger. Chapter 
II contains necessary background information that will build a foundation of certain 
concepts and practices as well as a literature review that examines perceptions, reports, 
and studies of cost impacts due to consolidation. Chapter III discusses the evaluation 
methodologies and Chapter IV presents and discusses the findings of positive or negative 
cost impacts on government programs following mergers and acquisitions and draws 
conclusions based on the empirical evidence. Lastly, Chapter V provides the answers to 
the research questions and provides recommendations for areas of further research to 
complement these findings.  
  
 6
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II.  BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.  INTRODUCTION  
Does consolidation affect program cost? Mergers and acquisitions generate much 
attention in public and political arenas because of potential economic influences. 
Congress has the fiduciary responsibility to the people to spend tax money wisely. 
Because of finite monies available, Congress scrutinizes budget requests and budget 
expenditures to minimize wasteful spending. Public and political concern on how tax 
money is spent coupled with the availability of data makes merger savings a controversial 
topic. First, this section provides background information and examines literature that 
gives evidence of a skeptical perception plus gives insights to studies whose findings 
sometimes conflict regarding the cost data validity and accuracy or if cost savings are 
even achieved. Second, this chapter also introduces the Selected Acquisition Report 
(SAR), which is the data source used in this analysis. Next, the roles and benefits of 
competition are discussed. Lastly, policy that impacts the consolidation of the defense 
industry is introduced. 
B.  PUBLIC VIEWS 
Some mergers and acquisitions, because of the notoriety or the potential economic 
outcomes, attract the media’s interest enough to investigate and publish comments on the 
situation. One article relates that Lockheed touted the savings that were created from its 
merger deals, but when pressed to name programs, Lockheed Chairman Norman 
Augustine could only name one (Pearlstein, 14 July 1997).   
A GAO study looked into one method that companies use to profess cost-savings 
post-merger layoffs (Cooper, 1998, 8). With consolidation,   through  a  merger  or  an
acquisition, the company may undergo some  workforce  restructuring.   The DoD had a 
policy that  paid restructuring costs to consolidating companies, which allowed  
government and the company to share in the savings realized to the government. The 
policy gained congressional and public scrutiny because it seemed to reward contractors 
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for undergoing large-scale downsizing or streamlining of the workforce in the name of 
cost savings (GAO, April 1996, 3). This procedure earned the stigmatizing label “payoffs 
for layoffs” from the media. 
The impacts of paying restructuring costs were not well received. The outrage 
about the government paying for restructuring costs is reflected in the bombastic press 
releases from congressional watchdogs. The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) 
argues that taxpayers should not bear any financial burden to subsidize defense industry 
consolidations “especially when [taxpayer’s] money is going towards firing workers.”5 
Opposition from within Congress sparked debate over the practice of downsizing for the 
sake of showing cost savings. Rep. Bernie Sanders, during debate of the 1997 defense 
spending bill argued that “…the taxpayers are providing payoffs for layoffs… 
[by]…giving multibillion-dollar corporations huge amounts of money in order to merge 
their companies, stifle competition, and lay off American workers.”6  
C.  POLITICAL VIEWS 
Much research and analysis has been done on the costs / benefits of mergers, both 
pre- and post-merger. GAO and RAND have conducted independent studies to determine 
program cost changes. The GAO is the congressional agency that, when instructed, 
studies programs and resultant expenditures of federal monies. The RAND Corporation 
conducts independent research and analysis to provide findings or additional information 
to decision makers and analysts. 
Company consolidation usually results in a realignment within the new company 
in order to make more efficient use of assets and, thereby, reduce overall project costs. 
Sometimes, during the Antitrust Agency’s review of M&A proposals, some consolidating 
companies are required to consent to divestitures in order to preserve continued market 
competition. Specifically regarding costs, every year, the GAO has provided Congress 
                                                 
5 “Payoffs for Layoffs: Much More Than a Sound Bite,” 11 March 1997, Press release available at 
http://www.pogo.org/p/contracts/ca-970311-reform.html, accessed 1 March 2007. 
6 Congressional Record, 13 June 1996, Vol. 142, p. H6347, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=1996_record&position=all&page=H6347, accessed 10 March 2007. 
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with analyses of varying aspects of defense industry mergers. For example, in 1996, 
GAO examined the cost savings of the Martin-Marietta and GE Aerospace merger. The 
GAO found that “showing restructuring savings would result in a net reduction of 
projected overhead costs” for the five defense programs selected for study (GAO, 1996, 
4).    
A GAO report looked into how much industry consolidation has taken place to 
help understand the potential impacts to competition. The report indicated the specific 
market sectors for DoD to monitor for competition issues if consolidation continued in a 
particular sector. DoD must have the ability to “identify and address potential harmful 
effects of mergers and acquisitions” that could impact national security (Cooper, 1998, 
1). A further review in 1998, GAO reported that “there is little evidence that the 
increased consolidation has adversely affected current DoD programs” (Cooper, 1998, 4). 
The study concluded that “consolidation has brought no real cost savings … at best 
defense costs grew at a lower rate” (Cooper, 1998, 2). However, GAO noted that DoD 
must continue to monitor the previously defined market sectors to avoid future problems.  
The GAO, in response to periodic Congressional inquiries, studied defense 
industry mergers to determine if savings on restructuring cost were realized. Although 
restructuring savings were less than initially estimated,7 savings did occur. The GAO’s 
first report on results from the DoD policy indicated a $1.49 in net savings for every 
$1.00 paid in restructuring costs (GAO, April 1996, 3). A few months later, GAO 
examined seventeen Martin-Marietta projects in 1996. GAO found that $1.00 paid in 
restructuring costs yielded a $2.41 savings for the first five projects and $8.02 for the last 
three projects8 (GAO, September 1996, 4). A later GAO study found, that for the 
companies studied, the DoD paid $179.2 million and realizing savings of $346.7 million. 
In other words, for every $1.00 paid in restructuring costs gave an estimated savings of 
$1.93 (GAO, 1997, 2).     
                                                 
7 In a July 1994 Congressional hearing, the Deputy Secretary of Defense testified that restructuring 
activities in the defense industry were expected to result in significant benefits to DOD—with savings 
exceeding costs up to seven times (i.e., $1.00 in restructuring costs yield up to $7.00 in savings). 
8 The review began with seventeen projects was reduced to five. The others projects were either 
uncertified or were unrelated to business consolidation.  
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The GAO also conducts a yearly assessment of major weapons programs 
throughout DoD. In 2004, fifty-one programs whose combined program costs exceed 
$672 billion were reviewed (GAO, March 2004, 1). In 2005, GAO assessed 54 programs 
whose combined investment exceeds $800 billion (GAO, Mar 2005, 1). In 2006, GAO 
assessed 52 weapon programs representing a projected investment of about $850 billion 
(GAO, Mar 2006, 1). A few program savings were over 10 percent, but some incurred 
cost increases of over 500 percent; the average over all programs was a cost increase of 
30 percent. The reports do not give insight to specific causes of cost increases, but the 
ramifications are well known: defense program cost increases diminish buying power for 
the DoD. Mergers and acquisitions during contract performance should show a cost 
savings, through synergistic effects, but it is not always the case; regardless, increased 
costs erode government agency’s limited budget. Within the limited budget 
apportionment, there must be a zero sum gain – an increase in costs of one program must 
be offset by a decrease in expenditure of another.  
The RAND Corporation research provides insights on the impacts of 
consolidation for trend analysis. The RAND Corporation examined how increasing 
consolidation coupled with diminishing defense program affects competition and 
innovation – two key aspects DoD expects and antitrust legislators regulate. The research 
on weapon systems focused on the aircraft industry, but still provides insights on the 
impacts of consolidation for trend analysis. The RAND Corporation looked at how 
increasing consolidation coupled with diminishing defense program affects competition 
and innovation – two key aspects DoD expects and antitrust legislators regulate. The 
report suggests that having only one or two dominant contractors may reduce the 
incentives for competition to innovate, even during periods of rising demand (Lorell, 
2003, 3). Since competition affects downward pressure on costs, this lack of competition 
may result in increased costs for defense programs.  
Defense industry globalization, too, has potential drawbacks. Foremost is a 
security concern when the host-country has access to sensitive military technology. The 
host-country could disclose information or sell technology to other firms/countries. One 
such situation that demonstrates a negative, and embarrassing, event involves a Dutch 
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firm acquiring an American firm that made lenses for spy satellites. The Dutch firm could 
possibly share the technology with potentially hostile countries such as China 
(Dombrowski et al., 2002, 25).  
A policy was enacted to prevent negative impacts that may result from 
globalization within the defense industry. The Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 enacted Section 721 in the Defense Production 
Act “authorizes the President to suspend or block foreign acquisitions, mergers, or 
takeovers of U.S.-located firms that pose credible threats to national security” 
(USD(ALT), 2007, 13). The DoD investigates the proposed transactions to ensure that 
the national security interests are not jeopardized. In the Annual Industrial Capabilities 
Report to Congress, the Office of Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Logistics & 
Technology, reported that, during 2006, “a review of the 113 cases indicates that 12 of 
the transactions (10.6 percent) involved U.S. firms deemed to possess critical 
technologies and 17 cases (15 percent) involved U.S. firms that were determined to be 
otherwise important to the defense industrial base” (2007, 19). Disallowing such 
transactions helps to preserve the US national security. 
D.  SCHOLARLY VIEWS  
Scholars, in an attempt to understand the nature of consolidation impacts began to 
dissect the cost relationships. Agrawal et al., (1992), conducted a time trend analysis of 
pre- and post-merger stock prices to examine affects on stockholder value. After 
adjusting for the firm’s size, they found that, “stockholders of acquiring firms experience 
a statistically significant wealth loss of about 10% over five years after the merger 
completion date” (1992, 14). Malatesta (1983) and Andrade et al. (2001), also empirically 
found that not all mergers proved beneficial in creating shareholder value. Although 
neither looked exclusively at the defense industry, both analyzed aggregate data for all 
mergers – both defense and non-defense companies. So, how does the defense industry, 
exclusive, compare? Driessnack et al., had similar findings within the defense industry. 
Their analysis indicated “it is not reasonable to expect consolidation will achieve 
significant benefits in firm stock performance (2003). Korb indicated the difficulty in 
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detecting merger cost savings, in terms of lower prices for weapons, since, arguably, “the 
theoretical cost savings from reducing capacity can be offset by the erosion in 
competition,” (1996) which could raise prices and retard innovation. If the stock price 
valuation is any indication of a firm’s well-being, then it appears that consolidation can 
produce a negative synergy.  
Defense industry consolidation has impacted expenditures for research and 
development (R&D). Deutch (2001), a former Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, theorized that to cope with acquired debt (through 
consolidation) and declining market valuations, companies reduce R&D expenditures to 
stay healthy. Linster et al., (2002), also indicated, through experimentation, that cost 
pressures for firms remaining after consolidation forced a reduction in efforts to innovate, 
such as R&D. Their experimentation of defense firm partnerships, which supports earlier 
research efforts, suggests that fewer resources are devoted to R&D efforts due to a causal 
relationship of spending during a collective effort (Linster et al., 2002). If consolidating 
firms are to keep defense program costs low, trade-offs between R&D expenditures and 
program costs could occur. 
Professor Nayantara Hensel, in NPS-AM-07-106 “An Empirical Analysis of the 
Patterns in Defense Industry Consolidation and Their Subsequent Impact,” (2007) 
explored, using SAR data, whether cost estimates were higher or lower post-merger 
across various weapons systems, weapons system categories, and defense contractors. 
The data and methodology used in this report follow her report, and the conclusions from 
this analysis are consistent with her findings.  
E.  SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORT (SAR)  
The SAR is a legally mandated9 summary report on the cost, schedule, and 
performance status of major acquisition programs. Each year, the Department of 
Defense10 must submit a SAR report to Congress depicting the actual and estimated 
                                                 
9 U.S. Code: Title 10, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 144, § 2432 Selected Acquisition Reports. 
10 The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Acquisition Resource and Analysis (ARA) 
consolidates and prepares the report. 
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costs11 and quantities of items the defense industry is currently working on. Congress can 
select specific programs of interest, but annual SAR cost data are mandatory for all 
programs in excess of $40,000,000 and not procured with a firm, fixed price contract. By 
exception, quarterly submissions are necessary if programs experience a unit cost 
increase of 15 percent or greater or a schedule delay of six months or greater,12 Congress 
uses the SAR as a legislative oversight tool to better understand defense program 
expenditures in order to make future budgetary decisions. The SAR is prepared in 
conjunction with President’s budget so that individual program cost proposal can be 
compared to the health the existing program. Information contained within the SAR 
comes directly from the program manager and is electronically compiled for a 
consolidated report. Each program’s current cost estimate is stated in terms of a base year 
in order to normalize inflationary impacts. Because Congressional decisions stem from 
SAR cost data analysis, analysts generally accept the SAR data as a viable database. 
However, it is not without fault as explained in a later chapter. 
Since the SAR cost reporting began 1969, Congress has made changes to the 
reporting structure to attempt to gain a better understanding of cost changes (specifically 
cost growth). While the SAR data are widely used and accepted, it is not without its 
shortcomings. Analysts must understand how these deficiencies affect cost pricing data to 
have more meaningful results. Some major problems that distort cost estimates if not 
normalized or accounted for include: shifting of the base year during program 
performance, changes in quantities, costs shared among joint programs, and varying 
inflationary estimates (Hough, 1992, 12-32).  
Among some analysts, there is skepticism regarding the complete cost of defense 
programs. The GAO expressed reservations about the quality of the data contained in the 
SAR for Major Weapon Systems (1988). The GAO also noted that in 1993 the Army did 
not report all relevant cost figures for the Blackhawk helicopter. The same report 
compared the Army’s various budget accounting mechanisms and found $187.5 million 
                                                 
11 Total actual funding for prior years and estimated funding for future years. 
12 Programs having a Milestone B or Milestone C approval that occurs within the reportable quarter 
are also included. 
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that was not included in the SAR report to Congress13. Defense guidance on preparing 
SAR seemingly implies some latitude on the types of costs required for inclusion, since 
total modification, support, and operating costs are not included in SAR data (GAO, 
1988). Understandably, some internal management reports separate the various cost 
categories to minimize cross spending of different “colors of money”; however, the GAO 
found that the Army did not “consistently report the same dollar amount for the same 
types of costs in different reports” (GAO, 1988, 5). Some analysts believe that 
inaccuracies in reporting are due to inaccurate program estimates. They have 
demonstrated that analytical tools such as logistic and multiple regressions can assist with 
more accurate program estimate determination (Moore and White, 2005; Tracy and 
White, 2005). Cost data in reports are only as good as the inputs. A lack of consistency 
and accuracy in reporting total program costs leaves Congress with an uncertain budget 
picture from which to make accurate fiduciary decisions. 
The GAO has conducted reviews of the SAR and has identified various problems 
with and within the SAR. One report identified that the majority of program cost 
increases were in the categories of cost estimates and quantity (GAO, 1988). This 
suggests that the responsibility of cost changes occur at various levels. For instance, cost 
estimates are inputted at the program manager level while quantity is determined at a 
higher agency level. Quantity can also be affected by changes in demand at the user level 
(i.e., require more or less of the items) or changes in program budget (i.e., less funding 
equates to a decrease in the number that can be purchased). The GAO found data are not 
reported consistently on the same systems and the data are often incomplete (i.e., all 
known costs are not included) (GAO, 1988). Another inconsistency in data is due to a 
lack of standardized rates used to remove inflationary impacts. The GAO found that cost 
changes due to economic factors were calculated in various ways. For instance, program 
cost projection decreases “resulted from either inflation being less than anticipated or 
having lowered the rates for future expected inflation” (GAO, 1988, 10). Variations of  
 
 
                                                 
13 Calculated by author using information within the GAO report, Table 1. 
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calculations also differ across the services. Within the same time period, the Navy and the 
Air Force reported cost projection decreases due to economic factors, while the Army 
reported an expected increase (GAO, 1988).  
While the problems with the SAR are recognized, it becomes difficult to make 
changes that all agencies can agree upon (GAO, 1988). Many changes have been 
identified, including: the need to update costs after fielding (GAO, 1990), automated 
report submissions and submission (GAO, 1989), inclusion of graphics (GAO, 1986), 
inclusion of complete life-cycle costs (GAO, 1989, 1990), and better accounting and 
financial systems (GAO, 1990). Regardless of the SAR deficiencies, the information 
contained within is a useful tool. While it may be difficult to determine an exact dollar 
amount, the SAR can provide a rough indicator or order of magnitude of program cost 
changes.  
F.  POLICY 
The most recent wave of consolidation began early in the Clinton administration 
with Defense Secretary Perry’s 1993 meeting with defense industry leaders. The 
subsequent and sustained decline in Defense appropriations from 1993 to 2001 helped to 
encourage consolidation through economic pressures. The government’s July 1993 policy 
to share in savings by paying restructuring costs further motivated defense industry 
consolidation. As found by GAO, the costs savings were not as high as expected. The 
Congress, in an attempt to add more oversight to restructuring costs paid, enacted section 
818 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995. This section 
requires an audit of proposed cost savings and a certification from a senior DoD official. 
Section 818 also required an annual report to Congress on restructuring activities and 
associated costs. Determination of restructuring costs was revised in Section 8115 of the 
National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997, and Section 8092 of the 
National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1998 that included provisions for 
the audit and certification authority regarding saving thresholds. 
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The payment of restructuring costs, provided the appropriate ratio of savings to 
payouts (2 to 1) is achieved, continues as an allowable cost as outlined in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation part 31. It is further promulgated in the DoD derivative of the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation.14  
To assist in cost estimate analysis, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) established the Defense Cost and Resource 
Center (DCARC) in 1998 to “collect historical Major Defense Acquisition Program 
costs….and make those data available for use by authorized government analysis to 
estimate the cost of ongoing and future government programs, particularly DoD weapon 
systems.”15 The DCARC combines information from required acquisition reports into a 
single, searchable database for authorized government users to access to assist in program 
cost estimates. 
In an attempt to reduce program cost increases, DoD made changes to acquisition 
policy regarding more stringent measures to more accurately estimate program schedules. 
GAO reported that of the 23 major programs across DoD, 10 experienced cost overruns 
(GAO, April 2006, 8). During the five year span, companies working on those programs 
have consolidated among the defense industry. It becomes difficult to pinpoint the nature 
of the increases, whether due to policy changes or synergies unrealized.  
The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Policy) 
(ODUSD(IP)) monitors the health of the U.S. defense industry. Annually, the 
ODUSD(IP) issues a report to Congress (Annual Industrial Capabilities Report (AICR) to 
Congress) outlining the state of the defense industry. Their focus is ensure that DoD 
policies, procedures, and action enable the U.S. to maintain a reliable, cost-effective, and 
sufficient industrial base16 that promote national security goals. The ODUSD(IP) 
elaborates that reliability, cost effectiveness, and sufficiency mean a timely delivery of 
products and services at or below cost targets that meet the prescribed performance 
                                                 
14 DFARS 231.205-70, External Restructuring Costs; DFARS 242.1204, Novation Agreements 
15 Defense Cost and Resource Center, http://dcarc.pae.osd.mil/, accessed 18 August 2007. 
16 ODUSD(IP) Homepage, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/, accessed 5 September 2007. 
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requirements. A means to achieve their goals is through policy recommendations that 
encourage competition and innovation. By highlighting industrial base deficiencies for 
critical technologies and implementing appropriate policy initiatives and remedies, the 
Department is positioned to facilitate innovation that promotes joint, cross-Service 
warfighting (AICR, 2004). The 2005 report indicated that the defense industrial base is 
not overly consolidated with sufficient competition that encourages innovation (AICR, 
2005). In the 2006, the study concluded that “a stable, robust, DoD funding is the primary 
factor in sustaining essential industrial capabilities supporting defense because such 
funding focuses market demand across a broad spectrum of industry segments to meet 
emerging and projected DoD requirements” (AICR, 2006, 1).  
G.  COMPETITION 
Open competition provides businesses the opportunity to compete on price and 
quality. While consolidation may be necessary to reduce excess capacity, absorb 
specialty technology/techniques, or garner market power, competition is in the best 
interest of the government to keep costs low and to encourage innovation. Competition is 
such an important part in gaining best value and preserving innovation that the DoD, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) must render 
approval before M&A occur.  
The DoD role in reviewing consolidation proposals within the defense industry is 
to ensure advancement of national security goals. Foremost, the DoD’s responsibility lies 
with maintaining national security; the DoD does not support consolidation that 
negatively impacts national security or hampers innovation. The DoD examines mergers 
to ensure a viable defense industrial base will remain after the proposed consolidation. 
The DoD also examines to see how the proposed consolidation will impact competition 
and innovation. 
The FTC and DOJ (the “Antitrust Agencies”) have concurrent jurisdiction over 
merger authorization and have responsibility to enforce antitrust laws. The FTC and DOJ 
focus on one overriding issue: “the likelihood that the transaction will harm customers in 
any relevant product market through increased prices or lower product quantity, quality 
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or service levels, or reduced technological innovation” (Pitofsky, 1997). The DOJ 
dedicates an entire division, the Antitrust Division, to review and approve only M&As 
that do not stifle competition or violate antitrust laws (DOJ & FTC, 1997, 4). Diminished 
competition results in higher acquisition costs, higher per unit prices, and less innovation 
on U.S. military products.  
Jacques Gansler, a former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, 
and Technology, is a large proponent of consolidation, globalization, and transatlantic 
partnerships. It was under his direction that consolidation was emphasized. He continues 
to advocate for consolidation, but not at the expense of competition (Gansler, 1999). He 
also acknowledges globalization is occurring and recommends its support in order to 
facilitate global partnerships and strengthen ally relationships, but not at the expense of 
breaches of confidentiality or security (Gansler, 1999).  
Economic pressures to consolidate continued to test the limits of allowable 
competition. Horizontal mergers continued until, at the top tier, only two or three 
remained in a single sector (i.e., General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman in 
shipbuilding; or Lockheed Martin and Boeing in aircraft manufacturing). DOJ would not 
allow a monopoly, which, obviously, defies antitrust laws. The next recourse some firms 
chose to continue in order to respond to market pressures was to pursue vertical 
integration (combining buyers and sellers) of lower tier suppliers. Once again, antitrust 
issues arose and prevented some mergers in which all primes could not access to 
supplies. One speculation of how top- and sub-tiers circumvent antitrust laws is by 
establishing strict buyer-seller relationships, thus controlling the vertical supply chain. 
Defense industry consolidation means there are fewer bidders pursue government 
contracts and, thus, makes it harder for the government to obtain the advantages of 
competition. The DOJ is concerned that mergers of firms in critical technologies may, 
during the bid evaluation process, withhold essential (and discriminating) technology 
from competitors and shut out competition (Kramer, 1999). That is, the firm with the 
latest technology could, essential, resort to monopolistic practices of market and cost 
control. Kovacic and Smallwood, in an analysis of defense mergers, (1994) saw the need 
to “preserve important rivalries” so that competition remains in critical technology areas. 
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Innovation continues as firms compete within their core competencies or niche areas of 
expertise. Gansler, too, in a multitude of addresses, advocates defense industry 
consolidation, but not at the cost of competition or innovation. The DoD does not 
discouraging further consolidation or divestiture, but continues to monitor the health of 
the defense industry in order to preserve defense industrial capabilities.  
H.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided some background information and reviewed literature 
regarding many aspects of consolidation and highlights the varying degrees of political 
and public support. There seems to be some public and congressional skepticism that cost 
growth occurs regardless of consolidation. This chapter also reviewed various reports on 
implications of consolidation regarding program costs and government cost savings. The 
next chapter outlines the methodology used in determining program cost impacts due to 
industry consolidation. It reviews some underlying assumptions and explains how the 
SAR data are organized for regression analysis.  
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III.  METHODOLOGY 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
There are various ways that program costs are reported, each report having its 
own specialized function. This analysis’s sole source of raw data is from MDAP SAR 
data. Although SAR cost information is available for hundreds of programs dating back 
to December 1969, this analysis looks at 359 programs across thirteen broad defense 
market sectors during the last wave of mergers from 1980 to 2006. The program’s 
information was collected from MDAP SAR submittals and consolidated to provide a 
representation of total cost estimate changes, if any, throughout the SAR reporting span 
attributable to consolidation. A regression analysis examines these data to explore for an 
empirical relationship post-merger effects may have on program cost changes.    
B.  ASSUMPTIONS AND GUIDELINES  
This analysis incorporated a few assumptions and guidelines to assist in selected 
programs and to highlight factors used in the analysis methodology. Many of these 
assumptions and guidelines were also used in Hensel (2007). They are indicated below: 
• Only mergers of equals were examined, that is, two companies of 
relatively equal size and functional capability (dominance) within their 
respective markets. Acquisitions of smaller or “niche” companies are not 
included. The assumption here is that smaller acquired companies have 
minimal effect on the parent company’s performance or that it is difficult 
to determine if the small company’s specialization is significant enough to 
impact the larger, newly-formed company. Mergers of equal but from two 
different industry sectors do not affect cross sector programs (i.e., While 
working on aircraft program, Northrop-Grumman acquires Newport News 
(primarily a shipbuilding company) and is assumed to not assist in the 
program). 
• Three months after the merger date (or the next closest chronological SAR 
reporting date following the three months) were needed to fully recognize 
any synergistic effects of a merger.  
• A merger must have occurred during the program’s performance. Only 
mergers with adequate time pre- and post-merger were considered (i.e., at 
least three SAR reports before and after the merger date) 
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• For multiple mergers, each merger was regressed separately using each 
merge date. Each segment is considered a separate program for this 
analysis.  
• Programs had to have adequate program duration in which to have at least 
seven SAR reporting periods.  
• Program is branch of service specific (i.e., the cost data is not combined 
where two services purchase the same product) 
• Base year remained constant during project duration. Programs changing 
base years were regressed separately using the single base year. 
• If Company A began work on a program and Company B purchased that 
company, Company A is considered the “Target” company. Conversely, if 
Company A began work on a program and purchased Company B, 
Company A is the “Acquirer.”  
After screening the programs using the criteria listed in Section 2, fifty singular 
programs remained, but by treating multiple mergers within the same program as a 
separate program, the number of programs is sixty-four. (See Appendix B) 
C.  SAR DATA SETUP 
The SAR data contains costs and cost estimates and are required annually, 
although there are situations requiring quarterly submissions, as stated in a previous 
chapter. By program, all SAR data are arranged chronologically according to SAR 
submission dates. Costs using current year estimates in base year dollars were used to 
minimize inflationary impacts. While the SAR also divides cost changes into separate 
categories (e.g., quantity, schedule, engineering, estimating, support cost changes, and 
other cost changes) for trend analysis, only the total procurement cost estimate in base 
year dollars was used in this analysis as it encompasses overall cost changes in their 
entirety. Each program was then classified using thirteen broad defense categories: 
Surface Ship (e.g., aircraft carriers, cruisers), Submarine, Fixed Wing Aircraft, Rotary 
Wing Aircraft, Tactical Wheeled Vehicle, Tracked Combat Vehicle, Tactical Missile 
(e.g., air-to-air, air-to-ground), Strategic Missile (e.g., nuclear, ballistic), Expendable 
Launch Vehicle (e.g., rockets), Satellite, Munitions (e.g., bombs, artillery, submunitions), 
Torpedo, and Strategic Electronics (e.g., communication, radar, navigation). The defense 
market categories mirror those indicated in the 1998 GAO report titled, “Competitive 
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Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions,” but with the addition of the strategic electronic and 
the munition categories. Table 1 illustrates how SAR data is organized with an example 























Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 6/30/1995 Navy 1920.9 McDonnell DouglasAircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 9/30/1995 Navy 1920.9 McDonnell DouglasAircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture199412/31/1995 Navy 2041 McDonnell DouglasAircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 3/31/1996 Navy 2041 McDonnell DouglasAircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 6/30/1996 Navy 2041 McDonnell DouglasAircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 9/30/1996 Navy 2041 McDonnell DouglasAircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture199412/31/1996 Navy 1959.5 McDonnell DouglasAircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 6/30/1997 Navy 1959.5 McDonnell DouglasAircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 9/30/1997 Navy 1959.5 McDonnell DouglasAircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture199412/31/1997 Navy 1888.4 McDonnell DouglasAircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 6/30/1998 Navy 1888.4 Boeing Aircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 9/30/1998 Navy 1888.4 Boeing Aircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture199412/31/1998 Navy 1949.3 Boeing Aircraft 
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 6/30/1999 Navy 1949.3 Boeing  Aircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 9/30/1999 Navy 1949.3 Boeing  Aircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture199412/31/1999 Navy 1961.3 Boeing  Aircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 6/30/2000 Navy 1961.3 Boeing  Aircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 9/30/2000 Navy 1957.2 Boeing  Aircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 9/30/2001 Navy 1957.2 Boeing  Aircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture199412/31/2001 Navy 1991.6 Boeing  Aircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 6/30/2002 Navy 1991.6 Boeing  Aircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture1994 9/30/2002 Navy 1991.6 Boeing  Aircraft
Fixed Wing AircraftAV-8B Remanufacture199412/31/2002 Navy 1999 Boeing  Aircraft
Table 1.   Example Program SAR information 
D.  REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Since this analysis specifically examines whether a system experienced higher or 
lower costs following a merger, a regression model was necessary to examine a 
program’s cost estimate over time. The regression model and the variables used follow 
Hensel (2007). The current cost estimates normalized by the base year was the dependent 
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variable of the regression model. Within the regression model, a time trend variable and a 
dummy variable became the explanatory variables. The time trend variable is a means of 
controlling for time related patterns within the program’s reporting periods. This was 
accomplished using a continual variable classification by consecutively numbering the 
program’s cost according to chronological SAR submission dates. The indicator variable, 
or dummy variable, is a binary classification for mergers and consist of zeroes for pre-
merger dates and ones for post-merger dates to differentiate the pre- and post-merger 
time periods.17 Regressions were done in two sets. The first assumed post-merger effects 
occurred immediately and, as such, included an indicator variable value of 1 as close as 
possible to the merger date or next successive SAR report date.  
The second set of regressions accounted for a three month lag to allow time for 
post-merger synergistic effects to occur. If there was no SAR report submitted at the 
three month point, the next following SAR report was used. For example, a three month 
lag from the 1 August 1997 merge date would ordinarily be 1 November 1997; however, 
the nearest SAR report is on 31 December 1997, and, therefore, is used instead.  
The resulting regression model used follows Hensel (2007):  
0 1 1 2 2Y X Xβ β β= + +  
Y:  Current Estimate in Base Year Dollars 
β0:  y-intercept coefficient 
X1:  Time Trend Explanatory variable 
X2:  Dummy Variable Explanatory variable 
After running the regression, the p-value for each of the explanatory variables 
indicated statistical significance for typical testing levels (i.e., alpha level of .10 or less). 
The p-value is the probability of a type-II error, in this case, a cost savings when it is 
actually a cost growth, and vice versa. For instance, a p-value of 0.0001 means that there 
is only one chance in 10,000 that a type-II error occurred by chance. The dummy variable 
coefficient for a particular system determined if the cost estimate increased or decreased 
as a result of industry consolidation. A negative dummy variable coefficient indicated a 
                                                 
17 Merger dates were obtained by examining news releases from the company, as well as by using 
Thomson Financial’s and Bloomberg’s databases. 
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cost savings possibly attributed to synergistic effects of the merger. Conversely, a 
positive coefficient indicates that the cost estimate increased over time.  
Once the regressions were completed, they were analyzed. For this analysis, p-
values of greater than 0.1 were considered not statistically significant. The results were 
grouped together into various categories such as defense market sector, branch of service, 
contractor, program, and target versus acquirer to examine overall trends and for trend 
comparison. 
E.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter explained the assumptions that guided the regression analysis of 
SAR data to explore whether program cost changes following a merger. This chapter also 
described how the data are organized and the methodology behind the regression 
analysis. The following chapter presents the findings. 
 26
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 27
IV.  PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Using the methodology as previously described, this chapter presents the 
regression analysis findings. First, the two sets of program cost regressions are presented 
to explore for statistical significance commensurate with when post-merger effects are 
assumed to occur. Second, the statistical significance of the assumed post-merger effects 
timeframes is compared. Last, using the program cost regressions, the results are 
categorized by defense market sector, branch of service, prime contractor, and 
consolidation based on target or acquirer company.   
B.  FINDINGS 
Table 2 shows the regressed data for weapon systems to identify a post-merger 
cost change beginning at the SAR Nearest to the Effective Date of the Merger. Table 3 
shows the regressed data for weapon systems allowing for a three-month (or more, 
depending how the merger date coincides with SAR submittal dates). For both tables, the 
first column is the weapon system name or acronym; the second column shows the 
coefficient of the post-merger indicator variable, but more importantly, its sign; the third 
column indicates p-value for the statistical significance of the indicator variable; the 
fourth column is the coefficient of the time trend variable, including its sign; the last 
column indicates the p-value for the statistical significance of the time trend variable. 
This set-up follows Hensel (2007).  
There is a wide variation of statistical significance for the cost changes, using an 
alpha test level of ≤ 0.1, among all weapon systems analyzed. Roughly half (24%) of the 
programs that have a statically significant indicator variable show a positive coefficient 
thus signifying a cost estimate increase. Alternatively, 31% of the programs that have a 
statically significant indicator variable show a negative coefficient thus signifying a cost 
estimate decrease. This suggests that cost estimates had a likelihood of experiencing a 
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decrease post-merger. Further analysis by categorizing the data in various ways is 
necessary to provide a better understanding of post-merger, program cost relationships. 
 















ADDS 1076.415 0.000 -64.910 0.000 
AFATDS -562.553 0.224 82.387 0.255 
AH-64 36.961 0.763 47.257 0.000 
AIM-9X 9.680 0.895 1.002 0.684 
AMRAAM  -1635.327 0.000 38.090 0.022 
ASAS using MM and LH 
Merge dates 
-1419.660 0.000 16.395 0.046 
ASAS using LM & Loral 
Merge dates 
179.459 0.640 -94.098 0.010 
ATACMS using N 
acquiring LTV dates 
414.584 0.061 11.928 0.239 
ATACMS using N merge 
G dates 
625.374 0.008 -2.777 0.818 
ATACMS using LH and 
MM merge dates 
22.491 0.932 24.882 0.099 
ATACMS-BAT using N 
& G merge dates 
932.540 0.044 63.164 0.001 
ATACMS-BAT using 
LM & MM merge dates 
1456.657 0.000 32.566 0.073 
AV-8B Remanufacture -113.645 0.001 6.545 0.005 
B-1 CMUP-JDAM -169.680 0.000 -2.956 0.322 
Bradley FVS -314.713 0.007 -1.619 0.624 
C-130H -2638.946 0.316 -316.623 0.499 
C-17A -2997.765 0.147 867.662 0.000 
CEC 205.759 0.055 72.051 0.000 
CMU 39.423 0.008 6.031 0.000 
Comanche (RAH-66) -480.168 0.114 121.981 0.000 
DDG-51 using GD and 
BIW merge date 
-2881.234 0.181 583.999 0.000 
DDG-51 using GD and 
NASSCO merge date 
-8303.437 0.000 701.224 0.000 
DMSP 15.714 0.322 6.557 0.000 
                                                 
18 B=Boeing; MD=McDonnell Douglas; MM=Martin Marietta; LH=Lockheed; N=Northrop; 
G=Grumman; GD=General Dynamics; RI=Rockwell International; R=Raytheon; TI=Texas Instruments 
Defense and Electronics; HA=Hughes Aircraft; HD=Hughes Defense; BIW=Bath Iron Works; 
NN=Newport News. 
19 Descriptions of each system can be found at the Federation of American Scientists website, 
www.fas.org, accessed 1 March 2007. 
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F/A-18 E/F using B and 
RI merge date 
-8497.550 0.036 -444.886 0.090 
F/A-18 E/F using B and 
MD merge date 
-15059.459 0.000 -136.510 0.392 
F-22 using LH and MM 
merge date 
-6951.452 0.003 84.001 0.313 
FBCB2 using NG and 
TRW merge date 
84.489 0.814 -87.531 0.116 
Global Hawk using NG 
and TRW merge date 
-1144.043 0.000 133.529 0.000 
JDAM using Boeing and 
MD merge date 
-848.820 0.015 144.485 0.000 
JPATS using R & Beech 
Aircraft merge date 
-1214.357 0.102 403.860 0.002 
JSIPS using R and E-
systems merge date 
-18.054 0.415 -0.072 0.969 
JSIPS using R and HA 
merge data 
48.510 0.018 -4.626 0.009 
JSIPS using R and TI 
merge data 
35.657 0.085 -3.497 0.039 
JSOW using R and TI 
merge date 
542.248 0.609 -9.995 0.827 
JSTARS using N & G 
merge date 
-1291.266 0.006 132.997 0.000 
LHD 1 using NG & 
Litton & Ingalls merge 
date 
251.019 0.210 53.765 0.000 
LHD 1 using NG and NN 
merge date 
144.317 0.476 55.225 0.000 
Longbow Apache using B 
& MD merge data 
889.256 0.002 -6.432 0.581 
LPD 17 using NG and A 
merge date 
3153.504 0.035 -108.166 0.287 
MCS (ATCCS) using LM 
& Loral merge date 
179.676 0.046 -12.833 0.003 
MLRS using N & LTV 
merge date 
-28.854 0.744 28.307 0.000 
Minutemann III PRP 
using ATK and Thiokal 
merge date 
115.211 0.246 -3.423 0.573 
MK-48 ADCAP using 
Hughes missile & GD 
Missile merge date 
-2315.352 0.007 -42.212 0.564 
NAS using R and E-
systems merge date 
207.563 0.047 25.757 0.000 
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NAS using R & TI merge 
date 
-266.038 0.005 40.330 0.000 
NAS using R & HD 
merge date 
-47.789 0.643 31.169 0.000 
NAVSTAR User Eqmt 
using B & RI merge date 
-212.399 0.013 29.502 0.000 
NESP using Raytheon & 
Hughes Aircraft merge 
date 
72.762 0.005 -5.994 0.000 
Patriot Pac-3 using R and 
HA merge date 
-399.635 0.131 165.078 0.000 
SBIRS using LM & Loral 
merge date 
-712.952 0.450 271.916 0.013 
SMART-T using 
Raytheon and Hughes 
aircraft merge date 
-162.308 0.002 -0.789 0.840 
SSN-21/AN/BSY-2 using 
GD and Bath Iron Works 
merge date 
5217.942 0.155 -438.829 0.026 
SSN-21/AN/BSY-2 using 
GD and NASSCO merge 
date 
4094.135 0.202 -312.487 0.020 
STD MSL 2 (BLKS I-IV) 
using R & E-systems 
merge date 
-1372.720 0.090 12.295 0.549 
STD MSL 2 (BLKS I-IV) 
using R & HA merger 
date 
-1308.101 0.082 7.951 0.660 
Stinger RMP 397.534 0.055 -67.029 0.001 
Strategic Sealift using GD 
and NASSCO merge date 
16.268 0.913 22.609 0.026 
T-45TS using Boeing and 
MD merge date 
-54.004 0.826 38.541 0.001 
THAAD20 using LM & 
Loral merger dates.  
-74.049 0.782 206.228 0.000 
Titan IV using LH and 
MM merge date 
-9604.986 0.000 504.366 0.000 
Tomahawk using Hughes 
Missile and GD Missile 
merge date 
14.456 0.972 23.953 0.034 
TOW2 using Hughes 
Missile and GD Missile 
merge date 
-135.132 0.218 25.521 0.000 
                                                 
20 THAAD is a DOD program; however, the program is managed by the Army and, as such, is 
included in this analysis as an Army specific program. 
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Trident II MSL (D-5) 
using LH & MM merge 
date 
-2111.671 0.056 10.351 0.679 
Trident II MSL (D-5) 
using LM & Loral merge 
date 
259.864 0.811 -36.213 0.141 
Table 2.   Regression Results with the Post-merger Effect Beginning at the SAR Nearest 
to the Effective Date of the Merger 


















ADDS 1134.148 0.000 -68.655 0.000 
AFATDS -655.607 0.148 95.076 0.179 
AH-64 36.961 0.763 47.257 0.000 
Aim-9x  12.303 0.849 0.880 0.737 
AMRAAM  -1635.327 0.000 38.090 0.022 
ASAS using MM and 
LH lagged Merge date 
-1419.660 0.000 16.395 0.046 
ASAS using MM and 
LH lagged Merge dates 
435.748 0.236 -112.192 0.002 
ATACMS using N & 
LTV lagged merge date 
515.896 0.019 6.832 0.505 
ATACMS using N & G 
lagged merge date 
425.944 0.089 5.875 0.663 
ATACMS using LH and 
MM lagged merge dates 
22.491 0.932 24.882 0.099 
ATACMS-BAT using 
M & G lagged merge 
date 
1033.998 0.019 55.986 0.004 
ATACMS-BAT using 
LM & MM merge dates 
1456.657 0.000 32.566 0.073 
AV-8B Remanufacture 
using B and MD lagged 
merge date 
-116.947 0.001 7.088 0.004 
B1- CMUP-JDAM 
using lagged B & RI 
merge date 
-67.867 0.274 -16.840 0.101 
Bradley FVS using GD 
and Chrysler lagged 
merge date 
-261.176 0.025 -2.086 0.556 
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C-130H using LML GD 
lagged merge dates 
618.330 0.835 -815.520 0.187 
C-17A using B and MD 
lagged merge data 
-2366.344 0.255 857.154 0.000 
CEC using R and HA 
lagged merge date 
205.759 0.055 72.051 0.000 
CMU using R and E-sys 
lagged merge date 
19.947 0.195 7.134 0.000 
Comanche using B and 
MD lagged merge date 
-428.818 0.157 118.975 0.000 
DDG-51 using GD and 
BIW lagged merge date 
-4241.243 0.047 618.211 0.000 
DDG-51 using GD and 
NASSCO lagged 
merged date 
-7864.683 0.000 687.088 0.000 
DMSP using LH & MM 
lagged merge dates.  
15.714 0.322 6.557 0.000 
F/A-18 E/F using B and 
RI lagged merge date 
-11760.287 0.002 -280.938 0.202 
F/A-18 E/F using B and 
MD lagged merge date 
-18423.336 0.000 -17.240 0.618 
F-22 using LH and MM 
lagged merge date 
-6951.452 0.003 84.001 0.313 
FBCB2 using NG & 
TRW lagged merge date 
-221.030 0.522 -49.847 0.320 
Global Hawk using NG 
& TRW lagged merge 
date 
-857.232 0.024 125.916 0.006 
JDAM using Boeing 
and MD lagged merge 
date 
-822.245 0.019 146.665 0.000 
JPATS using R & 
Beech Aircraft merge 
date 
-865.027 0.295 373.847 0.008 
JCIPS using R and E-
sys lagged merge date 
-11.502 0.620 -0.460 0.822 
JCIPS using R and HA 
lagged merge date 
48.510 0.018 -4.626 0.009 
JCIPS using R and TI 
lagged merge date 
24.360 0.244 -2.589 0.103 
JSOW using R and TI 
lagged merger date 
1631.275 0.126 -50.687 0.276 
JSTARS using N & G 
lagged merge date 
-1326.055 0.004 131.971 0.000 
 33


















LHD 1 using NG and 
Ingalls and Litton 
lagged merge date 
144.317 0.476 55.225 0.000 
LHD 1 using NG and 
NN lagged merge date 
92.409 0.652 55.916 0.000 
Longbow Apache using 
B and MD lagged 
merge date 
1030.945 0.000 -14.458 0.210 
LPD 17 using NG & A 
lagged merge date 
5420.160 0.000 -274.957 0.000 
MCS (ATCCS) using 
LM & Loral lagged 
merged date 
194.908 0.033 -13.599 0.002 
MLRS using N & LTV 
lagged merge date 
-34.901 0.693 28.377 0.000 
Minuteman III PRP 
using ATK and Thiokol 
lagged merge date 
70.572 0.484 -1.060 0.864 
MK-48 ADCAP using 
Hughes missile & GD 
Missile merge date 
-3417.718 0.000 38.217 0.171 
NAS using R & E-sys 
lagged merg date 
262.014 0.005 23.688 0.000 
NAS using R & TI 
lagged merge date 
-47.789 0.643 31.169 0.000 
NAS using R and HDS 
lagged merge date 
-70.238 0.504 32.246 0.000 
NAVSTAR User Eqmt 
using B and RI lagged 
merger date 
-191.890 0.024 28.756 0.000 
NESP using Raytheon 
and Hughes Aircraft 
lagged merge date 
56.997 0.037 -5.427 0.000 
Patriot Pac-321 using R 
and HA lagged merge 
date 
-454.014 0.064 167.821 0.000 
SBIRS using LM and 
Loral lagged merge date 
-606.365 0.533 273.514 0.025 
SMART-T using 
Raytheon and Hughes 
aircraft lagged merge 
date 
-162.308 0.002 -0.789 0.840 
                                                 
21 Patriot Pac-3 is a DOD program; however, the Army manages the program and, as such, is included 
in this analysis as an Army specific program. 
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using GD and Bath Iron 
Works lagged merge 
date 
5756.415 0.116 -463.305 0.019 
 SSN-21/AN/BSY-2 
using GD & NASSCO 
lagged merge date 
3719.280 0.258 -288.665 0.024 
STD MSL 2 (BLKS I-
IV) using R & E-
systems lagged merge 
date 
-1302.107 0.105 10.483 0.605 
STD MSL 2 (BLKS I-
IV) using R & HA 
lagged merger date 
-1372.720 0.090 12.295 0.549 
Stinger RMP 437.198 0.026 -68.557 0.000 
Strategic sealift using 
GD & NASSCO lagged 
merge date  
93.856 0.506 19.345 0.028 
T-45TS using B & MD 
lagged merge dates 
-130.784 0.601 41.480 0.001 
THAAD using LM and 
Loral lagged merge date 
3.629 0.990 200.490 0.000 
Titan IV using LH & 
MM lagged merge date 
-10094.531 0.000 513.138 0.000 
Tomahawk using 
Hughes Missile and GD 
Missile merge date 
117.352 0.770 21.899 0.046 
TOW2 using Hughes 
Missile and GD Missile 
merge date 
-83.516 0.471 24.132 0.000 
Trident II MSL (D-5) 
using LH & MM lagged 
merge date 
-2111.671 0.056 10.351 0.679 
Trident II MSL (D-5) 
using LM and Loral 
lagged merge date 
794.019 0.459 -46.146 0.057 
Table 3.   Regression Results with the Post-merger Effect at the Second Nearest SAR to 
the Effective Date of the Merger 
Table 4 compares the statistical significance of post-merger effects beginning at 
the merger date with the post-merger effects allowing for a three-month lag. As shown in 
Table 4, not every merger experiences a statically significant cost estimate change. The 
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statistical significance of post-merger cost estimate changes are similar regardless of if 
the effects were assumed to occur at the merger effective date (54.69%) or allowing for a 
three month lag (50%). The remainder of this analysis will focus on the more statistically 
significant assumption of the post-merger effect begins at the SAR closest to the merger 
date. It is interesting to note that the cost estimates are more likely to decrease in each 
assumed situation. These results are similar to Hensel (2007).  
 





















begins at the SAR 
closest to the merger 
effective date 
23.44% 31.25% 54.69% 
Post-merger effect 
begins at the second 
nearest SAR to the 
merger effective date 
20.31% 29.69% 50.00% 
Table 4.   Percentage of Systems Experiencing a Post-merger change in cost estimates 
Table 5 categorizes the weapon systems by defense market sector to determine if 
cost estimate changes are positively or negatively statistically significant within each 
sector, following the methodology in Hensel (2007). The largest percentage of the 
defense market to experience a statistically significant difference in post-merger cost 
estimates is within Strategic Electronics with 72% of the sector showing a cost change, 
44% of which is a cost increase. Roughly one-third of the Rotary Wing Aircraft sector 
demonstrated a statistically significant cost increase. Sixty percent of the Fixed Wing 
sector and 25% of the Strategic Missile sectors shows a statistically significant decrease 
in cost estimates. These percentages suggest that the Strategic Electronic sector had a 
propensity for cost increases and that the Rotary Wing sector had a propensity for cost 
decrease following defense industry consolidation. The Tactical Missile category, while 
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over half of the programs indicated a statistically significant cost change, had a slight 
propensity for cost increases. The programs analyzed in the Surface Ships category, 
however, saw neither a decrease nor increase in cost estimates. It is difficult to draw 
substantial conclusions from the categories of Munition, Expendable Launch Vehicle, 
Tracked Combat Vehicle, Submarine, Torpedo, since there is only one program within 
each of the categories.  
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Longbow Apache 





























44.44% 27.78% 72.22% 
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Defense Market 















































16.67% 16.67% 33.33% 
DMSP Satellite 
SBIRS 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Munition JDAM 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Minuteman III PRP 
Tomahawk Strategic Missile 
Trident II MSL (D-5) 
0.00% 25.00% 25.00% 
Expendable Launch 
Vehicle Titan IV 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Tracked Combat 
Vehicle Bradley FVS 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Submarine SSN-21/AN/BSY-2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Torpedo MK-48 ADCAP 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Table 5.   Percentage of Weapons Systems Experiencing a Post-merger Change in Cost 
Estimates by Equipment Category 
Table 6 categorizes the weapon system by the branch of service to which each 
program belongs. Half or more of the programs within each service experienced a 
statistically significant cost change; the Air Force with 62%, the Army with 52%, and the 
Navy with 50% cost estimate changes. The analysis results suggest that Navy and Air  
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Force programs were more likely to have cost estimate decreases post-merger (43% & 
36%, respectively) while the Army programs were more likely to have a cost estimate 
increase (38%).  
 
Branch of 
Service Weapon System 
Percentage of 
programs by service 
branch experiencing 
statistically 
































Minuteman III PRP 
NAS 























38.10% 14.29% 52.38% 
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Branch of 
Service Weapon System 
Percentage of 
programs by service 
branch experiencing 
statistically 





































Trident II MSL (D-5) 
13.64% 36.36% 50.00% 
Table 6.   Percentage of Programs Experiencing a Post-merger Change in Cost 
Estimates by Branch of Service 
Table 7 categorizes the weapon systems by the prime contractor responsible for 
program performance, following Hensel (2007). Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and 
General Dynamics’ post-merger effects on cost changes show that costs were more likely 
to decrease than increase. Of particular note is that not only did 70% of Boeing’s 
programs experience statistically significant cost changes, but also 60% of those 
programs had a propensity for cost decreases. 
General Motors is not considered a top five defense contractor; however, five 
programs met all analysis criteria for inclusion in this study and are useful in examining 
the other categories. Regression results indicated that 60% of General Motors’ programs 
experienced a statistically significant difference in cost estimates post-merger. During 
 40
their consolidation periods, 40% of those programs had a propensity for cost increases 
while only 20% were likely to decrease in costs post merger. 
Once again, it becomes difficult to draw substantial conclusions from categories 
containing only one program, as is the case with McDonnell Douglas and ATK. 
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0.00% 33.33% 33.33% 
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Prime 
Contractor Weapon System 
Percentage of 





































STD MSL 2 (BLKS I-
IV) 
33.33% 27.78% 61.11% 
McDonnell 







40.00% 20.00% 60.00% 
ATK Minutemann III PRP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Table 7.   Percentage of Programs Experiencing a Post-merger Change in Cost 
Estimates by Prime Contractor 
Table 8 summarizes the post-merger cost estimates in terms of the company’s role 
as target or acquirer. The majority of programs (52%-58%), regardless of whether a 
company was a target or the acquirer, experienced a statistically significant difference in 
post-merger cost estimates. Approximately half of the programs a target company saw a 
cost estimate increase, the other half, of course, saw a cost decrease. More programs are 




The acquirer company, on the other hand, showed a greater likelihood of cost 
estimate decreases post merger. This suggests that larger companies, while working on a 
defense program, are acquiring companies that are able to provide added experience, 
specialization, technique, or other cost saving benefit and are more likely to experience a 
lower post-merger cost estimate. 
 
 Percentage of programs 
by role in M&A 
experiencing 
statistically significant 
higher cost estimate 
post-merger 
Percentage of programs 
by role in M&A 
experiencing 
statistically significant 
lower cost estimate 
post-merger 
Percentage of programs 
by role in M&A 
experiencing statistically 
significant different cost 
estimate post-merger 
Target 25.81% 25.81% 51.61% 
Acquirer 21.21% 36.36% 57.58% 
Table 8.   Percentage of programs experiencing a post-merger change in cost estimates 
by the company’s role during the consolidation experience. 
C.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The analysis found that cost changes were statistically significant and of similar 
values regardless of whether the post-merger effects were assumed to occur at the SAR 
report date nearest the merger or at the next following SAR report date past the merger, 
which was consistent with Hensel (2007). The programs were then categorized by 
defense market sectors, branch of services, prime contractors, and, finally, by the role of 
a company during the merger or acquisition. From the categorization, trends emerged 
concerning the likelihood of cost changes depending on the category examined.  
Viewing the tables independently, the categorical analysis depicts some trends. In 
the defense market sector, Rotary Aircraft, Tactical Missile, Strategic Electronics saw 
cost estimate increases post-mergers; Fixed Wing aircraft saw lower cost estimates post-
mergers. By branch of service, the Air Force and the Navy’s programs saw cost estimate 
decreases post merger; the Army saw higher cost estimates. By prime contractor,  
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Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon saw cost increases (General Motors saw cost increases 
as well, but is not a top five defense contractor); Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and 
General Dynamics experienced lower program cost estimates post-merger.  
As viewed collectively, there also seem to be some identifiable trends. While 
Boeing displayed post-merger, cost estimate decreases, those decreases seemingly were 
not passed through to the Army for whom it was building Rotary Wing Aircraft, as 
evidenced by the sector’s propensity for experiencing higher cost estimates post-merger. 
Likewise, the Army’s propensity to experience higher cost estimates post-merger could 
also be affected through Raytheon’s production of tactical missiles. Raytheon 
experienced higher cost estimates and is the predominant of manufacturer of tactical 
missiles for which a large portion is for the Army.  
Surface Ships and Fixed Wing Aircraft, for which the Air Force and the Navy are 
the prominent customers, are made, for the most part, by Northrop Grumman, Boeing, 
and General Dynamics. All these companies experienced lower cost estimates post 
merger and could be a contributing factor to both the Air Force and the Navy’s lower cost 
estimates post merger. 
The Strategic Electronics defense market sector covers such a broad arena that it 
becomes more difficult to infer cost change conclusions. The systems within Strategic 
Electronics are spread throughout all branches of service and contractors. Likewise, it 
becomes difficult to draw substantial conclusions from categories containing only one 
program data point. However, the single data point from one category adds to data points 
in other categories, thus making the empirical output more robust.  
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the post Cold War 1990s, defense spending has decreased and 
consolidation among the defense industry has increased. A wide review of literature 
emphasized that many people within the public, political, and academic arenas have been 
concerned about competition, innovation, and, ultimately, cost growth. The literature also 
noted that there are some problems with the SAR database, to include inaccurate 
estimations, untimely submittals, and base year changes; however, the SAR, because it is 
used as a Congressional decision tool, is basically accepted as accurate for analysis 
purposes. From the SAR database, the raw data was organized and analyzed to identify 
cost trends of various programs (that met our analysis criteria) and to assist in gaining 
answers to the research questions posed at the beginning of this thesis. This analysis is by 
no means all inclusive and is intended to supplement past and future research in this area. 
This chapter, and thesis, closes with recommended areas for further study and analysis. 
B.  CONCLUSIONS  
1. Primary Research Question 
1.  Has defense industry consolidation from 1993-2006 saved acquisition 
costs for various Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP)? 
While consolidation may yield savings as a result of synergy, this does not seem 
to be true for all mergers; they do not always save costs. Furthermore, not every merger 
experiences a statically significant cost estimate change. Comparison of regression results 
across all the examined programs suggests that when there is a statistically significant 
cost change following a merger, that change shows a greater likelihood a cost estimate 
decrease than an increase. A categorical comparison across defense market sectors, 
branch of services, prime contractors, and by the company’s role during the consolidation 
experience (i.e., Target or Acquirer) suggest potential trends in cost estimate changes 
within each category. 
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2. Secondary Research Questions 
1.  Why did the Department of Defense (DoD) encourage defense 
industry consolidation and what policies were developed to support 
and encourage consolidation?  
A review of literature suggests that DoD encouraged defense industry 
consolidation as a means to reduce excess, post-Cold War, industrial capacity. The 
literature further suggests that DoD aided in preparing the defense industry for the 
precipitous decrease in defense expenditures. Perhaps the most influential DoD policy to 
encourage consolidation was the payment of restructuring costs. DoD waived what was 
once an unallowable cost and began to pay restructuring costs associated with 
consolidation provided there was evidence of cost savings to the government.  
2.  What were the acquisition policy objectives regarding consolidation?  
The acquisition policy objectives were to help the U.S. maintain a viable and 
healthy defense industry in light of reduced defense expenditures, without undermining 
competition or innovation. Paying consolidation restructuring costs, provided the 
appropriate ratio of savings to payouts (2 to 1) is achieved, were a means not only to 
encourage consolidation but also to strive for efficiencies so the government would pay 
the restructuring costs. 
3.  What were the acquisition policy outcomes regarding costs? 
The literature review suggests that restructuring savings were less than expected, 
but did occur. Some people claim that companies used downsizing the workforce in order 
to gain enough savings to warrant the government’s payment of restructuring costs. 
Others argue that market pressures would facilitate natural mergers without the need for 
monetary incentives. The literature also indicated that overall program costs have 
increased by an average of 30 percent. A few program savings were over 10 percent, but 
some incurred cost increases of over 500 percent. The regression analysis in this thesis 
suggests a decrease in cost estimates following a merger was more likely than an 
increase, which is consistent with Hensel (2007).  
 
 47
4.  What effect did the defense industry consolidation have on 
competition? 
Consolidation occurred rapidly between 1993 and 1997 to a point where further 
consolidation received added scrutiny from DoD and the antitrust agencies to prevent 
stifling competition or innovation. The DoD has not discouraged further consolidation or 
divestiture, but continues to monitor the health of the defense industry in order to 
preserve defense industrial capabilities.  
5.  How did program costs change immediately post-merger?  
Not every merger experiences a statically significant cost estimate change during 
program performance. The regression analysis, when the merger effect is assumed to 
occur at the nearest SAR report date, suggests a greater tendency for statistically 
significant decreases in cost estimates than increases, which is consistent with the 
findings in Hensel (2007).  
6.  How did program costs change post-merger allowing time lag (i.e., for 
synergistic effects to be realized)?  
The regression analysis, when allowing for a time lag post-merger, suggests that 
not all weapon system estimates were affected by mergers; however, when statistical 
significance exists, cost estimates were more likely to have a statistically significant 
reduction in cost estimates than an increase, which is consistent with Hensel (2007).  
7.  How did consolidation affect program costs within various defense 
sectors? 
The percentage of defense markets to experience a statistically significant 
difference in post-merger cost estimates suggest that the Strategic Electronic sector had a 
propensity for cost increases and that the Rotary Wing sector had a propensity for cost 
decrease resulting from defense industry consolidation. The Tactical Missile category, 
while over half of the programs indicated a statistically significant cost change, had a 
slight propensity for cost increases. The programs analyzed in the Surface Ships sector, 
however, saw neither a decrease nor increase in cost estimates. Singular programs within 
the defense sectors of Munition, Expendable Launch Vehicle, Tracked Combat Vehicle, 
Submarine, and Torpedo, limited substantial conclusions for cost change experiences.  
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8.  How did consolidation affect program costs within each branch of 
service?  
The analysis results suggest that Navy and Air Force programs were more likely 
to have cost estimate decreases post-merger while the Army programs were more likely 
to have a cost estimate increase. 
9.  How did consolidation affect program costs with prime contractors 
within the defense industry? 
Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and General Dynamics’ post-merger effects on cost 
changes show that costs were more likely to decrease than increase. The analysis suggests 
that Boeing’s programs had the greater propensity for cost estimate decreases post-
merger. Once again, singular programs for particular prime contractors (McDonnell 
Douglas and ATK) limited substantial conclusions for cost change experiences.  
It is difficult to pinpoint why certain contractors yielded savings while others 
showed cost increase. Possibilities of cost savings may be attributed to synergistic effects 
such as improved efficiency through organizational restructure, improvements in 
technology, or capitalization of particular expertise. Cost increases may result from 
merger-related synergies that were not realized or perhaps additional program 
requirements necessitated an increased expenditure. Unforeseen increases in overhead, 
labor rates, and material costs could also spur increases in program costs.  
C.  RECOMMENDATION 
Accurate information is necessary for the government to set realistic project costs. 
Standardized cost reporting provides project cost estimators with actual historical data in 
which to monitor, forecast, and estimate future program and contract costs. With accurate 
program cost estimates, it may be possible to alter contract types that shift more cost risk 
to the contractor. For instance, a firm fixed price contract places all cost risk onto the 
contractor, whereas a cost reimbursement contract shifts more risk to the government. 
Contractual clauses may be a means to stabilize costs. A clause to reassess program costs 
after mergers and to alter contracts accordingly may help incentivize companies to keep 
costs lower.  
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While consolidation may be necessary to reduce excess capacity, to absorb 
specialty technology/techniques, or to garner market power, competition is in the best 
interest of the government to keep costs low and encourage innovation. Without 
competition, companies can charge whatever they consider appropriate, at the 
government’s expense. Mergers during contract performance should show a cost savings, 
but it is not always the case; regardless, increased costs erode government agency’s 
limited budget. Within the limited budget apportionment, there must be a zero sum gain – 
an increase in costs of one program must have a decrease in expenditure in another.  
Since the literature suggests that there is room for improvement with SAR 
reporting, this is the first area that needs attention. DoD needs to provide more accurate 
program cost estimates. The review of literature has found various means and models in 
which to achieve more accurate estimates. Secondly, normalizing all programs reported 
in SAR by using a standard base year, a standard inflationary rate, and a per unit cost 
may simplify future analysis as well as provide an easier cross-program comparison of 
cost estimates. Lastly, it is important to monitor the payments of restructuring costs 
aggressively to see if the policy needs to be reconsidered.   
D.  FUTURE RESEARCH 
Further research on individual unit costs may show a more detailed look at cost 
changes pre- and post-mergers. A similar, time trend analysis of cost per unit can show 
the differences in cost estimates with and without a merger. Delving into a contractor’s 
financials can give a better estimate of the benefits of a merger from an accounting 
perspective as well as a return on investment comparison.  
This analysis focused on the top five defense contractors and omitted the impacts 
of smaller acquisitions on program cost estimates. Further investigation on how these 
smaller companies affect particular programs could enrich this analysis. Capitalizing on a 
smaller company’s niche in the market could be a cost savings driver. 
This study does not look at services. The Government Accountability Office 
estimates that Department of Defense obligations for service contracts have more than 
doubled since fiscal year 1996, rising from $66.4 billion to $141.2 billion in fiscal year 
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2005. Since around 60 percent of defense budget expenditures are for services contracts, 
the study of DoD-wide cost impacts is abbreviated by only looking at major defense 
programs. Perhaps, if data is available, exploring the acquisition of services may yield 
insights to merger impacts on cost estimates.  
Program costs are reported in various ways, each with slightly different purposes 
or intended for different audiences. Some are used for internal management and while 
others are used to separate various colors of money. To create a more robust cost estimate 
picture, conducting and comparing regression analysis using other cost estimate reports 
such as Defense Acquisition Executive Summaries, Management Decision Package data, 
Acquisition Program Baselines, National Defense Budget Estimates, or Congressional 
Data Sheets could display noticeable cost change trends due to industry consolidation. 
Similarly, the same type of analysis can be done on branch of services using data 
contained within branch specific databases such as Standard Army Procurement 
Accounting System (SAPAS), Standard Operations and Maintenance, Army, and 
Research and Development System, or other derivatives. Reconciling the SAR cost data 
with the Presidential budget may indicate to what extent or impact poor cost estimates 
translate to budget requests. 
The author understands that many of these programs have long since ceased either 
through termination or program completion; however, many programs are still ongoing. 
The trend analysis suggests that consolidation has resulted in decreased costs estimates 
on defense programs. Whether this translates to a decrease in actual costs is an entirely 
different subject needed for study. Conducing regression analysis using Program 
Objective Memorandum budget execution data or other comptroller actual cost data, may 
provide an effective cost change determination tool.  
This study did not look at type of contract used for the various programs. An 
additional study may delve deeper to see what contract vehicles are used with the various 
projects to see if any correlation exists between contract type and overall program costs. 
For instance, do sole source contracts with a cost plus fixed fee arrangement have a 
proclivity for cost overruns? 
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APPENDIX. TOP-5 DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION DIAGRAMS 































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 57
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker. “The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A 
Reexamination of an Anomaly.” Journal of Finance 47.4 (1992): 1605-1621. 
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford. “New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers.” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 15.2 (2001): 103-120.  
Bruner, Robert F. Applied Mergers and Acquisitions. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 2004. 
Cooper, David E. Statement of David E. Cooper, Associate Director, Defense 
Acquisitions Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division on 
Defense Industry Consolidation: Defense Industry Consolidation: Issues Related 
to Acquisition and Merger Restructuring Costs. Testimony Before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, 
House of Representatives, General Accounting Office, GAO/T-NSIAD-94-247. 
27 July 1994: 1-8.  
Cooper, David E. Statement of David E. Cooper, Associate Director, Defense 
Acquisitions Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division on 
Defense Industry Restructuring: Cost and Savings Issues. Testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology, Committee on Armed Services, 
United States Senate, General Accounting Office, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-141. 15 
April 1997: 1-15. 
Cooper, David E. Statement of David E. Cooper, Associate Director, Defense 
Acquisitions Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division on 
Defense Industry Restructuring: Updated Cost and Savings Information. 
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology, Committee 
on Armed Services, United States Senate, General Accounting Office, GAO/T-
NSIAD-98-156, 30 April 1998: 1-18.  
Cooper, David E. Statement of David E. Cooper, Associate Director, Defense 
Acquisitions Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division on 
Defense Industry Consolidation: Competitive Effects of Mergers and 
Acquisitions. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Acquisition and 
Technology, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, General 
Accounting Office, GAO/T-NSIAD-98-112. 4 March 1998: 1-11.  
Defense Science Board. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Antitrust 
Aspects of Defense Industry Consolidation to the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. Washington, D.C., 1994. 
 58
Deutch, John. “Consolidation of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base.” Acquisition Review 
Quarterly 137 (2001): 137-150. 
Dombrowski, Gholz, and Ross. “Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after 
Next.” The Newport Papers, Naval War College Press, (2002): 1-120. 
Driessnack, John D. and King, David R. “Investigating the integration of acquired firms 
in high-technology industries: Implications for industrial policy.” Acquisition 
Review Quarterly 10.3 (2003): 261-283. 
Driessnack, John D. and King, David R. “An Initial Look at Technology and Institutions 
on Defense Industry Consolidation.” Defense Acquisition Review Journal, 11.1 
(2004): 62-77.  
Federal Acquisition Regulation. http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffara.htm, accessed 8 August 
2007. 
Gansler, Jacques. “Twenty-First Century Coalition Warfare: Implications for the Military 
and for Industry.” Presentation at the 16th International Workshop on Global 
Security – Budapest. 20-23 June 1999. http://www.csdr.org/99Book/gansler.htm, 
accessed 5 March 2007. 
Gaughan, Patrick. Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate restructurings. 4th edition. New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004. 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, Managing Acquisitions: Creating Value through Corporate 
Renewal, The Free Press, New York, 1991. 
Hensel, Nayantara D. NPS-AM-07-106. “An Empirical Analysis of the Patterns in 
Defense Industry Consolidation and Their Subsequent Impact.” NPS Acquisition 
Sponsored Report. 30 September 2007.  
Hough, Paul G. Pitfalls in Calculating Cost Growth from Selected Acquisition Reports, 
RAND, N-3136-AF (1992): 1-62. 
Klein, Joel I. Statement of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, 
US Department of Justice, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States 
Senate, Concerning Mergers and Corporate Consolidation. 16 June 1998. 
Knox, Bernard D. “Ten Years Worth Of Procurement Reforms With Specific Attention 
To Selected Don Programs.” MBA Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California. December 2002. 
Korb, Lawrence J. “Merger Mania: Should the Pentagon Pay For Defense Industry 
Restructuring?” The Brookings Review 14.3 (1996): 22-25. 
 59
Kovacic, William E. and Smallwood, Dennis E. “Competition Policy, Rivalries, and 
Defense Industry Consolidation.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 8, 
No. 4. (Autumn 1994):  91-110. 
Kramer, Robert. Statement of Robert Kramer, Chief, Litigation Section, Antitrust 
Division, U.S. Department of Justice DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Before the 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Concerning Antitrust 
Considerations in International Defense Mergers. 4 May 1999. 
Linster, Bruce G.; Slate, Stephen; and Waller, Robert L. “Consolidation of the U.S. 
Defense Industrial Base: Impact on Research Expenditures.” Acquisition Review 
Quarterly, (Spring 2002): 143-150. 
Lorell, Mark. The U.S. Combat Aircraft Industry. RAND, MR-1696-OSD, (2003). 1-133. 
Malatesta, Paul H. “Wealth Effects of Merger Activity,” Journal of Financial Economics 
11.1-4 (1983): 155-181. 
Martin, Chinyelu M. “Defense Sector Consolidation: Will Consolidation Within The 
Defense Sector Improve The Financial Performance Of Defense Contractors 
While, Simultaneously Yielding Cost Savings to Taxpayers?” MBA Thesis. 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. December 2005. 
Mazur, David J. “Defense Mergers and Acquisitions: In the Name of Efficiency.” MBA 
Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. December 2006. 
Mitchell and Mulherin. “The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring 
Activity,” Journal of Financial Economics 41 (1996): 193-229. 
Moore, Gary and White III, Edward. “A Regression Approach for Estimating 
Procurement Cost.” Journal of Public Procurement, Volume 5, Issue 2, (2005): 
187-209. 
O’Rourke, Tracy. “Post-merger Integration.” In Richard S. Bibler, ed. The Arthur Young 
Management Guide to Mergers and Acquisitions, 1987.  
Office of Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology & Logistics. Annual 
Industrial Capabilities Report to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate 
and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. February 
2007: 1-96. 
Pearlstein, Steven. And Then There Were Three. The Washington Post, 14 July (1997). 
Perry, William J. “Three Barriers to Major Defense Acquisition Reform,” Defense Issues, 
8 (1983), 1-18. 
 60
Pitofsky, Robert. Statement of Robert Pitofsky, Federal Trade Commission Chairman, 
Before The Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Acquisition and 
Technology, United States Senate, Concerning Competition Policy Concerns in 
Defense Industry Mergers. 15 April 1997. 
Suhan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin, “Do Strategic Alliances Create Value,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, 46 2 (1997), 199-222. 
Tracy, S. P. and E. D. White, “Risk Management: Predicting Estimate at Completion,” 
38th Annual Department of Defense Cost Analysis Symposium, Williamsburg, 
VA, 15-18 February 2005. 
U. S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶13,104 (April 2, 1992), as amended, 8 
April 1997. 
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, 
Technology, & Logistics. Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR). 1980-2006. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Reliability of Weapon Cost Reporting is Questionable. 
GAO/AIMD-94-10. 28 October 1993: 1-40. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Air Force Does Not Effectively Account for Billions of 
Dollars. GAO/AFMD-90-23. 23 February 1990: 1-112. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Analysis of Major Weapon Systems Cost and Quantity 
Changes. GAO/NSIAD-89-32FS. 30 November 1988: 1-150. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Contractor Restructuring: First Application Of 
Cost And Savings Regulations. GAO/NSIAD-96-80. 10 April 1996: 1-13.  
U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Industry: Consolidation and Options for 
Preserving Competition. GAO/NSIAD-98-141. 7 April 1998: 1-25. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Industry: Mandated Study on Consolidation 
and Competition. GAO-03-864. 30 July 2003: 1-125.  
U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Restructuring Costs, Information Pertaining to 
Five Business. GAO/NSIAD-97-97. 25 April 1997: 1-35. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Restructuring Costs, Projected and Actual 
Savings From Martin-Marietta Acquisition of GE Aerospace. GAO/NSIAD-96-
191. 12 September 1996: 1-13.  
U.S. General Accounting Office. GAO Report to Congressional Committees on Defense 
Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Major Weapons Programs. GAO-04-248. 
31 March 2004: 1-139.  
 61
U.S. General Accounting Office. Highlights Of A GAO Forum: Mergers and 
Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and 
Other Federal Agencies. GAO-03-293SP. 14 November 2002: 1-16. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Improving DoD’s Weapon System Acquisition 
Reporting. GAO/NSIAD-90-20. November 1989: 1-24. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Long-Term Costs Are Not Reported to the Congress. 
GAO/NSIAD-90-226. 10 August 1990: 1-77.  
U.S. General Accounting Office. Selected Acquisition Report: Suggested Approaches for 
Improvement. GAO/NSIAD-86-118. 17 July 1986: 1-38. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience 
Cost and Schedule Problems under DoD’s Revised Policy. GAO-06-368. 13 April 
2006: 1-39.  
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Defense Industry Restructuring: Clarification of 
Cost and Savings Issues. NSIAD-97-186R. 17 June 1997: 1-10. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. GAO Report to Congressional Committees on 
Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Major Weapons Programs. GAO-
05-301. 31 March 2005: 1-150.  
U.S. Government Accountability Office. GAO Report to Congressional Committees on 
Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Major Weapons Programs. GAO-
06-391. 31 March 2006: 1-149.  
Vartabedian, Ralph. Consolidation of Big Defense Contractors May Not Mean Big 
Savings. Los Angeles Times, 6 April (1997). 
Weston, K.S. Chung and S.E. Hoag, Mergers, Restructuring and Corporate Control, 
Prentice-Hall, London, 1990. 
Zegley, Gary R. “Case Studies of Merger Activity in the Defense Industry Since 1993.” 
MBA Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. June 2006. 
 62
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 63
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Dr. Nayantara Hensel 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Douglas Brook 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) 
Washington, D.C. 
